One of the strengths of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the party that has held the rein of power in Ethiopia for the past twenty-seven years and a coalition of four ethnicity-based parties, is its culture of secrecy, keeping discussions and meetings to itself if this could be considered strength at all. Its central committee meetings, often held in closed sessions, were shrouded in mystery and matters discussed and agreed rarely disclosed to the public. A book written by Berhane Tsegab, former Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and EPRDF member entitled “Ye Hiadig Kuklkulet Guzo” (EPRDF’s downhill journeys) aims to lay bare in-camera dealings and showdowns of the party that took place away from the prying eyes of journalists and the public. It includes reports of the crucial meetings held from 2012-2017, mostly to review solutions to the political problems dogging the country, as public grievances and protests mounted. Considering the current status of the ruling EPRDF and all the radical changes it has gone through, the events described and the issues discussed in those meetings are already old hat, speaking news-wise. Nonetheless, they remain important records to understand the working of the party and its apparatus, speeches, utterances and diverse points of view delivered in the series of meetings that party held with its venture of “deep renewal.”

A note on the author

Before his recent expulsion from the TPLF’s central committee, Berhane Tsegab was regarded as one of the youngest and remarkable intellectual members of the TPLF and the EPRDF leaderships, albeit a discreet one who kept a low profile. His activism and commitment to the TPLF party began at the age of 16 when he took up arms in the fight against the Derg regime in the early 90s. But it was only after the death of Meles Zenawi in 2012 that he was made to join as the central committee member of TPLF, when the party saw the need to infuse itself with the new blood, replacing some of the old guards. Since then, Berhane was given top jobs in the Tigray regional government, including in the finance and revenue bureaus. After TPLF lost most federal cabinet positions and control of business conglomerates two years ago, Berhane was removed from the central committee membership, mostly owing to his outspokenness.

Infighting, division within the leadership

In his book, the author documents the story of the post-Meles years of the EPRDF through detailed narrative and reports of the meetings, by highlighting the debate on the party’s shape, future direction, correctives suggested to address poor governance. He explains how infighting, division within the leadership and the inability to adjust to changing reality has undermined its capacity to govern and eventually accelerated its appalling decline.  

The book has twelve chapters and is dedicated to “the fighters who died heroically, fighting for a popular cause into the path of democracy and prosperity.” It begins by tracing how the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi after more than 20 years in power has left the party in a power vacuum and ferocious battle for control among the top brass leadership. As it was stipulated in the constitution, Hailemariam Desalegn was first in the line of succession to assume the post until the next election, despite the overall agreement that he did not possess the same standing and commanding power of his predecessor who was considered a hard act to follow by many. Hailemariam, all the same, came to take the helm, mostly because the old guards and combatants of the TPLF were confident that they could control him. The author maintains that despite the appearance of a smooth transition and spirited efforts to douse the flames of infighting, evidence points out that the gradual journey to collapse started around then. 

 Azeb Mesfin’s hidden ambitions?

One revelation of this book is how Azeb Mesfin, Meles Zenawi’s widow resisted the nomination of Hailemariam Desalegn as Prime Minister and tried to remove him from the ticket.

Azeb during the meeting argued that Hailemariam lacked the capacity to navigate difficult situations and she instead nominated Sufian Ahmed, the long-serving minister of finance, whom she described as head and shoulders above the former and possessed better leadership capacities. However, other TPLF old-timers were already on board with Hailemariam who was picked up by Meles as his preferred successor. They were rather skeptical of Azeb’s motive, suspecting of her harbouring the thought of taking over the helm herself, by placing someone loyal to her, the author tells us. At another meeting a few years later, Seyoum Mesfin, one of the TPLF’s original founders, complained about how Hailemariam was put under pressure as he was unable to live and work in the palace for two months when Azeb had refused to leave the palace. He also said she bullied the Prime Minister, by telling him to step down from Meles’ chair.

Resistance to succession plans

The succession plans intended to see lead party figures leave key government positions to retire or become diplomats abroad have been inconsistently implemented, we learn from the book. In the 11th TPLF Congress held after the death of Meles to facilitate leadership succession, several senior leaders resisted on the grounds that their experience would be required to fill the void left by the deceased prime Minister. Seyoum Mesfin in April 2018 would lament that the fact that he and other of his colleagues were made to step down from the central committee of TPLF without their consent left them embittered and resentful. The various internal attempts within the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), the Oromo People Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and Southern Nations Region (SNNPR) to effect a succession plan through the Central Committees did not go well in accordance with the plan, either. This not only showed how superficial the party’s commitment was to the pledge but exposed the leadership rivalry that aggravated disunity within the party, with ethnic loyalties, business rivalries, and patronage leading to a debilitating stalemate, the author indicates.

The battle for control of the party

As Berhane explains, the battle to dominate the party and then the country’s politics would come to be the defining feature of the five years. The four-party members of EPRDF ruled through separate alliances that constantly feuded over who should have been promoted to core positions. The curious decision to nominate three deputy prime ministers, representing three parties in the coalition was intended to forge a modicum of unity. The four-day congress of the EPRDF held at a regional town Bahir Dar on March 2013 paved the way for newcomers to come forward the party’s election of the executive and central committees but did not resolve the divisions and tensions among the members, Berhan writes.

Further back-channel squabbles or conspiracy escalated after another meeting in Addis Ababa’s national palace eight months later, following the arrest of top officials of the revenue and customs authority, including Minister Melaku Fanta and his deputy, Gebrewahid Woldegiorgis. The overall public perception that that corruption campaign was used for political purposes was also echoed by certain members of the party.  The misdirected energies will make it difficult for the party to reunite, refocus and embark on effective programmes and mobilisation.

Looking at the debating topics chronicled in the book once could understand that EPRDF bigwigs were very good at detecting and analysing problems that could prove life-threatening for the party. Bereket Simon, who had been the public face of the government for almost two decades as the information minister and a close ally of Meles Zenawi, was known to have warned about the danger of state capture by some influential businessmen.  But the startling comment was from Sebaht Nega, a founding member of the TPLF, who was quoted to have said in one meeting, “TPLF was a progressive organization, which assessed situations and strengthened itself without committing the error of underestimating its enemies. But now it is being plagued by infighting, forming clicks, deception, and even physical abuse. I have never seen a party that is riddled within intense infighting like TPLF. The cutthroat is absolutely incredible.” Sebhat’s admission was an unsurpassed confession of the condition of the party but, we came to learn that, it was said with the intention of attacking the then head of the Tigray region, Abay Woldu who was immediately removed from his post and executive member position, accused of gross inefficiency and incompetence.  Sebaht then concluded that the party was back on track, thanks to the “renewal”.

Selecting a new leader

Some of the more interesting episodes involve the meetings and events in early 2018 that saw Abiy Ahmed, the leader of the OPDO, elected chairman of the party and consequently Prime Minister of the country. Abiy was first elected to head his party a few months ago, replacing Lemma Megersa, in what was widely believed an operation to enhance his chances of becoming prime minister. This was six weeks after Hailemariam Desalegn announced his resignation, citing obstacles and pressure from certain corners that undermined his leadership, as he told the party meeting, even though that was not how he characterized in a televised address before. A TPLF member pushed the outgoing Prime Minister to clarify what these obstacles were and why he decided to throw in the towel, and Hailemariam sharply turned the question back on him, “Haven’t you attended the TPLF central committee meeting?” The message was not lost on the examiner and other participants, because the pressure on Hailemariam emanating from the TPLF circle was discussed and assessed in that meeting, the author says.

From the narration, we could understand that TPLF brass leaders were not keen on Abiy Ahmed from the very start. The person that they had in mind was, maintains the author, Shiferaw Shigute of the Southern People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM), whom they probably saw as an easy figure to manoeuvre. But for their party, they had decided not to put their hat in the ring, for fear that election of TPLF member as prime minister would likely to deepen divisions within the coalition. Rather, the plan was to manage to wangle their way out of dividing Amhara and Oromo and backing the South. That was why the TPLF’s Alem Gebrewold forwarded the name of Shiferaw as the first nominee for the preliminary election of the three candidates the party agreed to name, which made TPLF’s intentions clear, Berhane says. “But the group dubbed “Team Lemma” and others, including Hailemariam Desalegn, had already sorted out this and came armed with the plan, something which was not known by the TPLF,” the author writes. Lemma Megersa presented Abiy’s name as the second nominee. “But then objections were heard against Abiy’s nomination, five from TPLF, two from ANDM, and one from SEPDM bitterly opposed the nomination. Abiy himself and the other seven OPDO members reacted to the opposition and made their cases why he could make a good candidate. Finally, by securing the substantial votes of OPDO, ANDM, and more than half of the southern party, Abiy’s nomination was accepted. This has visibly got Shiferaw and TPLF leaders anxious. But the principal question was who would be the third candidate, Demeke or Debretsion. Whose votes should be divided?  Subsequently, an ANDM member proposed Debretsion, something that was fiercely opposed by him and other TPLF participants. OPDO, ANDM, and SEPDM partially supported the candidacy of Debretsion. But he again objected to his nomination. A vote was cast for the second time and the party members remained adamant, and Debretsion was kept as a candidate. The calculation from “Team Lemma” seemed to be transformed into a reality,” Berhane chronicles. 

Abiy won 108 votes out of 180, while Shiferwa Shigute collected 59, meaning Abiy would take over as the new prime minister. Debretsion got just two votes. “In his victory speech, Abiy promised to fulfill the responsibilities bestowed upon him. Then another EPRDF, another story, another book,” the book concludes.

Considering the information that formed the basis for this book is mined from his own notebook, one cannot but admire the author’s note-taking skills and an excellent memory.  That is even more remarkable when we learn that there is still more information that he has not made available because of its sensitivity to national security. Unless it was recorded and transcribed, or minutes consulted, I still find it hard to comprehend how he could manage to do it. The book does offer a real insider’s glimpse.

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